Private Information in the BBV Model of Public Goods

To analyze the private provision of a public good in the presence of private information, we explore the connections between two frameworks: the binary public good model with threshold uncertainty and the standard continuous model à la Bergstrom et al. Linearity of best responses in others' contributions is key to matching the two frameworks. We identify all utility functions that display this linearity, and we provide conditions ensuring that the minimal properties that Bergstrom et al. require for utilities are satisfied. Using techniques developed in the threshold uncertainty framework, we show existence and uniqueness of the Bayes‐Nash equilibrium—thus generalizing existing results—and we analyze its comparative statics properties. In particular, under the reasonable assumption that agents' income is stochastic and private information, we complement the full‐information crowding‐out and redistribution results of Bergstrom et al. If the government taxes agents' income proportionally and redistributes (expected) revenues lump sum, equilibrium public good provision can increase or decrease, even if the set of contributors is unchanged. Similarly, we show that crowding‐out can be one‐for‐one, less than one‐for‐one, or more than one‐for‐one. Finally, we extend our results to a multidimensional framework in which agents' unit costs of contributions are also private information.     

Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union at the Zero Lower Bound

This paper constructs a two‐country core–periphery New Keynesian model of a currency union to address the interaction between the objectives of regionally directed fiscal policy constrained by a single currency and the aggregate use of fiscal policy in face of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy interest rates. We identify an optimal path of aggregate and relative fiscal policy responses to a negative region‐specific demand shock. Our results show that (i) in a monetary union, the optimal policy response to an asymmetric reduction in demand concentrated in the periphery always entails a relative shift of fiscal expenditure toward the worse‐affected regions, (ii) though no aggregate fiscal response is required outside the ZLB, and (iii) optimal union‐wide fiscal policy is expansionary at the ZLB. Therefore, optimal policy always entails an expansion in the periphery at the ZLB, but the optimal fiscal response in the core regions can be either expansionary or contractionary depending on the parameters of the model. However, (iv) fiscal expansion in the core is warranted if the periphery cannot implement an expansion due to constraints on public spending.     

Cost Savings from Check 21 Electronic Payment Legislation

Electronic payment legislation permitted an initially paper substitute digital image of a check, and later the electronic digital image of a check, to be processed and presented for payment on a same‐day basis. By shifting to electronic collection and presentment, Federal Reserve per item check processing costs fell by over 70%, reducing estimated overall U.S. payment system costs by $1.16 billion in 2010. Payment collection times and associated float fell dramatically for collecting banks and payees with consequent additional savings in firm working capital costs of perhaps $1.37 billion and indebted consumer benefits of $0.64 billion.     

THE ROLE OF COST IN DETERMINING WHEN FIRMS OFFER BUNDLES*

We model competitive bundling and tying, allowing for marginal cost savings from bundling, fixed costs of product offerings, and variation in customer preferences. Pure bundling can arise either because few people demand only one component or because, with high fixed costs, a single product efficiently satisfies customers with diverse tastes. We conclude by analyzing empirically the bundling of pain relievers with decongestants. The discount for the bundled product is large. We argue that our model provides a simpler, more compelling explanation for the size of the discount than the demand‐centered approach to bundling by a monopolist.     

Optimal Dissent in Organizations

We model an organization as a two-agent hierarchy: an informed Decision Maker in charge of selecting projects and a (possibly) uninformed Implementer in charge of their execution. Both have intrinsic preferences over projects. This paper models the costs and benefits of divergence between their preferences, that is, dissent within the organization. Dissent is useful to (1) foster the use of objective (and sometimes private) information in decision making and (2) give credibility to the Decision Maker's choices. However, dissent comes at the cost of hurting the Implementer's intrinsic motivation, thereby impairing organizational efficiency. We show that dissent can be optimal, in particular, when information is useful and uncertainty is high. Moreover, dissent remains an optimal organizational form even when Implementers can choose their employer or when Decision Makers have real authority over hiring decisions.

Workers do, and managers figure out what to do.
                                            F. Knight (1921)

     

Do Casual Workers Find Permanent Full-Time Employment? Evidence from the Australian Youth Survey

The growth of casual employment in Australia is sometimes viewed with concern. Such 'non-standard' forms of employment are often associated with intermittent labour force attachment, underemployment and low income. In this paper, we use data from the Australian Youth Survey to analyze the transition from casual work to full-time permanent jobs. In the short term, gender, employer-provided training and the receipt of government benefits are among the more important factors affecting the transition. However, these factors are less important in the long term. Overall, the results suggest that casual employment may be more of a 'stepping stone' than a 'dead-end'.     

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity‐based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity‐score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.     

The Tax Incidence of Lotteries: Evidence from Five States

The nature of revenue generation for state‐sponsored lotteries has been an issue of public debate for quite some time. Although most studies have found lotteries to have a regressive tax incidence, several have concluded otherwise. Unfortunately, the vast majority of academic studies address this concern by examining the tax incidence of only one state's lottery and/or by using only one time period's data. In addition, many assessments of the tax impact of lotteries fail to consider other demographic variables that may influence purchase patterns and, thus, be of interest to policymakers. To remedy this, the current paper assesses the incidence of the lottery excise tax for five states using county level data spanning multiple years. Also assessed are changes in incidence across demographic groups as the lotteries matured. Lottery tax incidence is assessed with multiple regression estimates of the income elasticity of demand for lottery products. The predominant finding is that the lottery tax for these states had a regressive incidence. Otherwise, few consistencies in either change in lottery tax incidence or purchase patterns across demographic variables were found.